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Abstract— Next generation wireless communications such as
5G are expected to feature wide channel bandwidths on the order
of hundreds of MHz. As bandwidths increase, circuit impairments
caused by frequency dependent behaviour such as ripple and
tilt in gain and group delay become more significant. PAPR
of OFDM signals also increase with increasing number of sub-
carriers. Transmitter circuit characterisation for the wide-band
frequency response is needed to pre-compensate the signal to be
transmitted. In this article, we propose a novel scheme which uses
the circuit characteristics combined with the channel response to
generate the keys for encrypting signals to provide an additional
tier of security at the physical layer. The modulated constellation
of the signal of interest is encrypted by dispersing its phases in
addition to encrypting the bits using Diffie Hellman scheme. It is
also shown that the method is able to reduce the PAPR of OFDM
signals. This scheme is experimentally validated from end-to-end
on a millimetre wave wireless link at 28.9 GHz demonstrating
security against a well-positioned eavesdropper and a reduction
of PAPR by 3.5 dB in a 2048 point OFDM signal with 1664 active
QPSK modulated sub-carriers.
Index Terms— Encryption, wireless communication, physical
layer security, peak to average power ratio.
I. INTRODUCTION
MODERN wireless communications involve transmissionof digital data over vector modulated radio frequency
(RF) carriers. Unlike, wired communication schemes, wireless
data transmission is of broadcast nature where the occurrence
of transmission is sensed and can be received by multiple
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receivers including the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers.
The security of the data transmitted depends on the ability
to encrypt the data such that only the legitimate receivers
are able to interpret the message. This task is conventionally
handled in the higher layers of the network protocol stack
with techniques such as scrambling, bit and packet encryption.
These techniques however do not encrypt the air interface of
the wireless network and therefore leave the nodes open for
traffic analysis and interception by eavesdroppers and man-
in-the-middle platforms [1], [2]. One of the ways to reduce
the probability of interception by an unauthorized node is to
provide a degree of security in the physical layer (PHY) inde-
pendent of the network protocols and infrastructure. Physical
layer security has been gaining interest among researchers
in recent years. A number of PHY security schemes such
as data encryption in physical layer [1], [3]–[9], direc-
tional modulation [10], RF fingerprinting, and discrete Fourier
transform spread orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
(DFT-S-OFDM) have been proposed [10]–[14].
Data encryption in the physical layer involves scrambling
the bit stream with a secret code that is mutually agreed by
the legitimate nodes and unknown to eavesdroppers. In [1],
the genuine nodes operate in a timed manner. The two nodes
exchange packets of data sequentially at 2.4 GHz (802.11 stan-
dard) where the receivers run a level crossing algorithm to
parse the received bits. The time indices where valid bits
were found are recorded at both nodes and exchanged after
a sufficient number of probes. An eavesdropper would get
information on the time indices but not the parsed val-
ues thereby maintaining secrecy between the genuine nodes.
In [3], [4], the key is generated from the channel variation
statistics instead of using the current channel state information
to generate the encryption keys. In [3], the proposed scheme is
experimentally validated using Software Defined Radio (SDR)
modules configured for operation in accordance with the WiFi
standard. In [7], the authors exploit the channel reciprocity
between two legitimate nodes in a given time-slot to probe
the channel with preamble of the 802.11i standard to generate
symmetrical encryption keys at the two nodes which are used
to scramble the data before transmission. A similar scheme
employing Discrete Fourier Transform Spread Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiplexing (DFT-S-OFDM) has been
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proposed in [10]. In all these schemes, the probing signal
chosen is OFDM modulated which is a very convenient choice
for stimulus but exhibits a high peak to average power ratio
(PAPR). PAPR of a complex envelope modulated signal s(t)
may be expressed mathematically in the form
P AP Rd B = 10Log10 max[(s(t)s
∗(t)]
E[(s(t)s∗(t)] (1)
where E[.] represents the mean of the variable enclosed in
the square brackets. Non-linearity of the RF Power Ampli-
fier (RFPA) would cause Amplitude Modulation-Amplitude
Modulation (AM-AM) and Amplitude Modulation-Phase
Modulation (AM-PM) distortions. This in turn requires
techniques such as PAPR reduction followed by Digital
Pre-Distortion (DPD) for linear operation.
In [1], the authors mitigate the impact of time variant behav-
iour of the channel by using the application layer traffic infor-
mation for key generation and have experimentally validated
the scheme using SDR modules. This can serve to mitigate
the impact of AM-AM distortion to a limited extent but its
effectiveness when applied to probing signals received from
transmitters subject to PAPR reduction schemes is currently
not clear. In [5], the phase response of the channel between
two authentic nodes is probed and is used for encryption key
generation. This provides a greater degree of secrecy in com-
parison with schemes that involve Received Signal Strength
Indicator (RSSI) figures due to greater sensitivity of phase
to signal propagation path. The probing signal here is also
OFDM modulated whose high PAPR would cause AM-PM
when passed through a non-linear RFPA. This would introduce
an uncertainty in the phase perceived by the receiver. The
authors propose to quantize the received phases to nearest fixed
values to mitigate the effect of non-ideal channel which is not
exactly reciprocal. This can help to mitigate the problem with
AM-PM distortion to a limited extent but experimental val-
idation with hardware has not been performed to test its
effectiveness. In this paper, we expand the idea of generating
physical layer encryption information published in the above
prior arts to include the practical non-ideal hardware and
channel aspects that affect the key generation process and
evolve a scheme to further strengthen the secrecy of the
channel encryption data.
The above schemes focus on scrambling the data such that
the data interpreted by the eavesdroppers from the received bit-
streams is erroneous. Schemes such as Directional Modulation
(DM) [10], [13], [14] and fast polarization hopping [12]
impair the ability of an eavesdropper to receive the transmitted
modulation symbols. The scheme proposed in this paper aims
to complement the above schemes aimed at impairing the
ability of eavesdroppers to receive the transmitted symbols
to strengthen the security further.
The problem with PAPR mentioned above has been miti-
gated in multiple ways involving time domain techniques such
as clipping and companding and frequency domain techniques
such as Selective Mapping (SLM) [15], tone injection [16],
optimized constellation modification [17] and Partial Transmit
Sequence (PTS). In [18], the authors accomplish both physical
layer security and PAPR reduction for optical communication
Fig. 1. CCDF plot of a 2048 point OFDM signal with 1664 QPSK modulated
sub-carriers exceeding threshold PAPR values.
Fig. 2. Example of diffie hellmann Key exchange.
through the use of chaotic sequences generated using a two
dimensional logistic mapping. Each OFDM frame is encrypted
U times with U encrypting chaotic sequences. The encrypted
OFDM symbols are accompanied with pilot symbols which
contain the labels of the encrypting sequence. In this paper
we expand the concept in [18] to provide PAPR reduction
and Physical Layer encryption in wireless communications
together without the need to transmit labels and using mutually
known information generated through convolved channel and
hardware responses. The eavesdropper is obfuscated due to the
combined impact of circuit and channel impairments on the
probing signal.
Advanced wideband communications employing OFDM
schemes such as 5G-NR feature channel bandwidths up to
400 MHz in Ka-Band with FFT sizes up to 4096. This
indicates a high probability of PAPR increasing above 10dB.
The bandwidth dependent impairments such as ripple and tilt
in gain and group delay become significant with increasing
signal bandwidths. These are caused by critical blocks in
a transmitter such as digital-to-analogue-converters (DACs),
mixers, band-pass filters (BPF) and amplifiers whose non-
uniform gain and phase responses over the channel bandwidth
need to be compensated to maintain the integrity of the
signal being transmitted. This is accomplished by running
a calibration routine on the transmitter using a feedback
receiver as detailed in [19]. It is proposed to exploit the
frequency response of such non-ideal hardware along with
channel response to generate encryption information for the
constellation. The encrypted constellation is used to exchange
bit level encryption keys as per Diffie Hellman scheme [20].
An example of Diffie Hellmann key exchange is summarised
in Fig. 2. While the scheme is novel, it is critical to ensure that
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the key exchange does not take place with an impersonating
attacker. The physical layer encryption scheme proposed in
this paper increases immunity to impersonation attacks during
the key exchange process.
In [21], a security scheme exploiting the parameter group
delay (GD) to secure the physical layer was proposed.
The work presented in this paper provides a novel exten-
sion to accomplish encryption of modulated signals to pro-
vide security together with reduction of PAPR in OFDM
schemes.
1) A scheme to generate encryption keys using the channel
characteristics between two legitimate nodes in convo-
lution with the circuit characteristics of the transmitting
hardware at the two nodes.
2) A legitimate node transmits a constant envelope stimulus
without pre-compensating the signal to mitigate its cir-
cuit impairments. The second legitimate node receives
the transmitted signal and measures the impairments in
it which is a convolution of the channel and circuit char-
acteristics of the transmitter at the first node. The second
node re-transmits the stimulus without pre-compensating
the stimulus to mitigate its circuit impairments. This is
received by the first node which measures the channel
characteristics convolved with the circuit characteristics
of the second node.
3) Each node then convolves its own circuit characteristics
with characteristics evaluated from the received signal.
This leads to symmetric information at both the legiti-
mate nodes to generate the modulation encryption keys.
The eavesdropper would find it difficult to distinguish
the circuit characteristics from channel characteristics
by evaluating the signals it received.
4) The modulation encryption key is used to generate fre-
quency domain phase offsets which disperse the phases
of the signal’s constituent frequency components thereby
encrypting it.
5) The two nodes agree values for base ’g’, modulus
’p’ and exchange A = (ga)modp and B = (gb)modp
respectively over the wireless link through modulation
encrypted signals. Each node the computes symmetric
keys from the received values of A and B by computing
(Ba)modp and (Ab)modp respectively to yield the bit
encryption keys.
6) The proposed dispersion of phases in the frequency
domain also reduces the PAPR of OFDM signals.
7) The entire scheme system has been experimentally val-
idated successfully with zero BER (Bit Error Rate) at
the legitimate receiver.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: In
Section II we describe the proposed scheme of concealing the
air interface parameters by introducing constellation distortion
in the modulated signal with calculated amounts of non-linear
phase or GD variation across the occupied bandwidth and
its inverse operation at the authorized receiver to recover the
original modulated signal. Experimentally measured results at
28.9 GHz to validate the technique are presented in Section III.
Finally in Section IV we present the main conclusions from
this work.
Fig. 3. Generalized block diagram of a wireless transceiver.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
The generalised block diagram of a wireless transceiver
is shown in Fig. 3. In the transmitting section, the digital
signal processor (DSP) performs the task of vector modulation
symbol generation, baseband filtering, digital up-conversion
(optional), baseband filtering, quantization and yields the
in-phase I and quadrature Q components of the intended
digital baseband modulated signal. These signal components
are then applied to digital-to-analogue converters (DACs)
whose outputs are vector up-converted to an intermediate
frequency (IF), further up-converted to the intended RF carrier
frequency, amplified and subsequently transmitted. The non-
ideal characteristics of these hardware blocks such as sinc-
roll off in DACs, amplitude ripple, tilt and group delay in
the amplifiers, mixers and filters respectively result in non-
uniform gain and phase responses to wideband signals. These
impairments would need to be compensated by means of a
calibration process to maintain the integrity of the modulated
signal being transmitted in addition to AM-AM and AM-PM
characteristics of the RFPA. The AM-AM and AM-PM distor-
tion may be considered negligible if the envelope of the input
signal is constant.
In the receiver, the signal sensed by the antenna is subject
to low noise amplification by the RF low noise amplifier
(LNA), down-conversion to an intermediate frequency, further
vector down-conversion to extract the I and Q baseband
components which are digitized in the analogue to digital
converter and applied to the DSP for digital demodulation and
further processing. The wideband non-uniform gain and phase
responses are also observed in the receiving blocks. This also
requires calibration over the band of interest to maintain the
integrity of the received wideband signal.
One of the ways to provide authentication in physical layer
is to encrypt the modulation parameters of the transmitted
signal by introducing a known amount of distortion in the
constellation with a controlled parameter, the parameter is in
turn set using a secret key known only to the authorised nodes.
We propose to accomplish this task by distorting the phases of
the modulated symbols in a controlled and reversible manner.
A. Key Generation Scheme in TDD Systems
This case represents the potential application scenarios in
small cells and short range wideband millimetre wave wireless
Authorized licensed use limited to: Maynooth University Library. Downloaded on October 27,2020 at 14:22:49 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
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communications. The key generation in this case exploits
channel reciprocity between two legitimate nodes. Practically,
a channel is never reciprocal but may be assumed reciprocal
within the channel coherence time. This time interval is
dependent on the frequency of operation, environmental fading
and Doppler effect in the channel of operation. The first step is
to let the two legitimate nodes probe the channel. The probing
signals are required to be shorter than the channel coherence
time Tc.
Tc = 9
16π fd
(2)
fd = v f
c
(3)
where fd is the Doppler frequency, f is the carrier frequency
of operation, c is the velocity of propagation of an electromag-
netic wave in free space and v is the radial velocity between
the nodes in m/sec. The duration of the probing signal and
the propagation time between the communicating nodes needs
to be significantly lower than the channel coherence time T c.
In a time division duplex (TDD) system, the transmission is
half duplex implying that only one node can transmit in a
given time-slot. Therefore, the combined signal duration and
propagation delays for channel probing by both nodes needs
to be significantly lower than the channel coherence time.
An alternative to OFDM stimulus with high PAPR used in
prior arts is a constant envelope chirp stimulus. A frequency
modulated chirp signal described mathematically in (4) and (5)
where y(n) is the value of the nth sample, Ts is the sampling
interval, M is the total number of samples, k is the frequency
variation parameter, fmax and fmin are the maximum and the
minimum frequencies respectively. Another advantage of a
chirp signal exploited in this work is its relative higher immu-
nity to channel noise. The received signal at the legitimate
nodes can be subject to piece-wise analysis since the spectral
content of each piece is distinct and does not overlap with
other the spectral content of other pieces.
y(n) = sin
{
2π
(knTs
2
+ fmin
)
nTs
}
(4)
k = fmax − fmin
M
(5)
The duration of the probing signal is MTs . This needs
to be chosen such that the sampling interval is lower than
the Nyquist rate for the intended bandwidth and the overall
signal duration is significantly lower than half of the channel
coherence time. The two nodes also need to be synchronised in
time so that they transmit without collision at the appropriate
time slots. The wireless channel model for probing is shown
in Fig. 4. The procedure to probe the convolved channel and
circuit characteristics of the transmitting node by assessing
their impact on a known test signal can be derived assuming
the following conditions.
1) Node 1 and Node 2 are the legitimate nodes and Node 3
is an eavesdropper.
2) The legitimate nodes have their clocks and timing cir-
cuits synchronized with a common reference source such
as a GPS. A timed interrupt logic runs on each node to
enable transmission.
Fig. 4. Channel model for probing.
3) The carrier phases of the local oscillators (LOs) are
synchronized with GPS disciplined oscillators or similar
reference sources.
4) The hardware signal paths in the receive section of each
node are calibrated to mitigate hardware impairments
such as IQ phase offset, IQ gain imbalance, etc using
techniques described in [19] or similar. The hardware
signal paths in the transmit section of each node are not
calibrated for wideband gain and phase variations.
5) The impact of RFPA non-linearities such as AM-AM
and AM-PM distortion on the constant envelope probing
signals is negligible.
6) The receiver at each node is calibrated over the band-
width of interest for pass-band gain flatness and phase
linearity.
The proposed procedure to probe the channel response is
summarised in Fig. 5. First we let Node 1 initiate the probing
by transmitting a predefined chirp signal described by (4)
at time interval T1; Node 1 switches to receive mode after
transmission. Node 2 is maintained in receive mode till time
interval T2.
T2 > T1 + Tsym + Tp + Tg (6)
where, Tsym is the probe signal duration, Tp is the propagation
time, Tg is the guard interval and Tg ≤ Tp . Node 2 receives
the transmission from Node 1 until time T2 and transmits
the pre-defined chirp pulse at time T2. Node 1 receives
the transmission from Node 2 during this period until time
interval T3 where T3 − T2 = T2 − T1.
This is repeated at time slots T3, T5 and T4 and T6
respectively. T6 − T1 < Tc (channel coherence time). The
received magnitude responses are normalised to the peak
amplitude values observed in each time slot and are averaged.
The averaged response r2 received by Node 2 is an ideal
Chirp signal y(n) convolved with the impulse response h11
of Node 1’s transmitting hardware and the impulse response
of the channel h21. Similiarly, averaged response r1 received
by Node 1 is an ideal Chirp signal y(n) convolved with the
impulse response h22 of Node 2’s transmitting hardware and
the impulse response of the channel h12. The fast Fourier
transform (FFT) of the averaged responses is computed at both
nodes for ease of analysis. The FFTs may be expressed as
in the equations below. Since the receivers in the nodes are
calibrated, their hardware responses may be absorbed into H21
Authorized licensed use limited to: Maynooth University Library. Downloaded on October 27,2020 at 14:22:49 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
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Fig. 5. Key generation work flow for TDD systems.
and H12.
R2( jω) = Y ( jω)H11( jω)H21( jω) (7)
R1( jω) = Y ( jω)H22( jω)H12( jω) (8)
Node 2 then de-convolves y(n) from r2 and convolves the
result with its own transmitting hardware’s impulse response
h22 to yield e2 (E2( jω) in frequency domain). Node 1 then
de-convolves y(n) from r1 and convolves the result with its
own transmitting hardware’s frequency response h11 to yield
e1(E2( jω) in frequency domain). If H12 = H21, then E1 = E2
as can be seen from the equations below.
E2( jω) = R2( jω)
y( jω)
H22( jω) (9)
yielding
E2( jω) = H11( jω)H21( jω)H22( jω) (10)
E1( jω) = R1( jω)
y( jω)
H11( jω) (11)
yielding
E1( jω) = H22( jω)H12( jω)H11( jω) (12)
The above scheme aims to generate symmetric encryption
keys at both nodes with asymmetric transmitted informa-
tion. The eavesdropper Node3 will be able to receive the
transmitted chirp signals but will not be able to distinguish
the impairments caused by the channel from that caused by
un-calibrated transmitting hardware at each legitimate node.
Since the transmission of the chirp signals is controlled by
timed interrupts, response by the eavesdropper Node 3 to
the stimulus from Node 1 will accompany the response from
Node 2. This can delay the agreement of symmetric keys
between Node 1 and Node 2 but Node 3 will not be able
to get the key data.
In a practical scenario, E1 will not be equal to E2 owing to
noise, variations in performance of receiving hardware and
Fig. 6. Normalised convolved channel and hardware frequency responses.
measurement errors but will be highly correlated showing
similar trends. A shifted fast fourier transform (FFT) plot of
convolved channel and circuit characteristics computed over
a bandwidth of 100 MHz at a carrier frequency of 28.9 GHz
is shown in Fig. 6. The evaluated responses E1 and E2 are
subject to moving median filtering of a pre-determined window
length to mitigate the effect of noise and receiving hardware
introduced impairments. One of the ways to extract symmetric
data for encryption is to perform non-linear curve-fitting on
sections of the computed responses and to use the evaluated
coefficient values for key generation. For example, the filtered
responses may be classified into regions depending upon
change of slope of the frequency response and each region
is subject to piece-wise non-linear curve-fitting operations
applying the method of least squares. In Fig. 6, the responses
in the frequency band 28.85 GHz to 28.86 GHz show a
rising slope. This may be classified as a region. Similarly,
the responses in the bands 28.6 GHz to 28.9 GHz, 28.9 to
28.92 GHz, 28.92 GHz to 28.94 GHz and 28.94 to 28.95 GHz
may be classified as four more regions after being subject to
moving median filtering operation to mitigate the impact of
noise. The responses in the above regions may be subject to
curve-fitting operation applying the method of least squares in
accordance with equation
y(n) = ax3 + bx2 + cx + d (13)
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The ratio of the curve-fitting coefficient values are com-
puted, rounded off to nearest integer values and quantized to
nearest prime numbers to yield a set of encryption keys which
may be designated as key1.
The filtered responses are then divided into a convenient
number of regions or sub-bands of equal lengths and clas-
sified on the basis of signal power distribution.For exam-
ple, divide the responses into 8 regions or sub-bands of
bandwidth 12.5 MHz. The highest prime number in this
band 761. This will be the first element of second key set
designated as key2. Similarly, the highest prime number in
the band with the next highest band power is extracted and
is stored as the second element of key2. This continues
till all eight elements of key2 are extracted. The sequence
in which the prime numbers are entered in the space of
key2 is critical. The key sets key1 and key2 are expected
to be the same at the legitimate nodes Node 1 and Node 2
due to highly correlated responses and different at Node 3.
This can be inferred from Fig. 6 which shows plots of
experimentally determined convolution of frequency responses
of the channel the hardware at 28.9 GHz over a bandwidth
of 100 MHz.
The extraction procedures for the encryption information
mentioned above are not exhaustive and there can be several
other ways of extracting symmetric encryption keys depending
upon the application.
A subset of prime numbers is chosen from both the keysets
and applied as coefficient values to a non-linear function such
as an elliptic function to derive a set of phases for encryption
of the spectral characteristics of the modulated signal to be
transmitted by dispersing its phases. The encrypting symbols
and the phases are updated with new values after convenient
intervals using different non-linear functions and a different set
of prime numbers from the two key sets to maintain security
against brute force attacks and avoid letting the adaptive
equalizers in the eavesdropping nodes learn the encrypting
information.
The effectiveness of encryption is proportional to the num-
ber of secret bits that can be generated by channel probing. But
this value is limited by the channel noise and dynamic range of
the hardware modules in the transceivers at the communicating
nodes. But the encryption information generated so far would
be suitable to authenticate a stronger key generation process.
A Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme is initiated to increase
the security against brute force attacks. The values of modulus
and base are either pre-determined or transmitted from Node
1 to Node 2 over through modulation encrypted signals.The
encrypted modulation symbols proposed authenticate the gen-
uineness of the probing nodes and increase immunity against
impersonation attacks. Node 1 and Node 2 then exchange
the preliminary keys A and B through modulation encrypted
signals. Each node then computes the bit level encryption
keys as illustrated in 2 The data to be communicated is
first encrypted at bit level using the bit encryption keys,
modulated in baseband, subject to encryption of the modulated
constellation and transmitted. The process is reversed at the
receiver to recover the transmitted data. The length of the bit
encryption key is chosen to be at least 512 bits.
Fig. 7. Proposed physical layer encryption scheme with encryption filter.
Fig. 8. Frequency response of a hamming windowed filter.
B. Encrypting the Constellation in Single
Carrier Modulated Signals
The proposed physical layer encryption and decryption
process at the transmitter and receiver of each node to secure
the communication is summarized in Fig.7. A key parameter of
the physical layer components that can have an adverse impact
on the integrity of the modulation symbols transmitted is the
group delay (GD) variation over the bandwidth of interest.
Group delay is defined as the rate of change of phase with
angular frequency.
G D = dθ
dω
(14)
where GD is the group delay in seconds, θ is the phase in
radians and ω is the angular frequency in radians/second. It is
a parameter that refers to the dispersion of the individual fre-
quency components that constitute the spectrum of the desired
modulated signal. Experimental results in [22] indicate that a
significant amount of constellation distortion is introduced in
a QPSK modulated carrier if a parabolic group delay variation
higher than 1.15 times the symbol duration Ts is introduced.
This can be exploited to provide security in the physical layer
of a single carrier wireless communication system by means
of a programmable dispersive filter.
The spectral characteristics of single carrier modulated
signals can be encrypted using dispersive filters to distort the
modulation phases. A dispersive filter is one which exhibits
a non-linear phase response or group delay in the frequency
domain. Such a filter can be designed in the digital domain by
manipulating the phase response of a Finite Impulse Response
(FIR) filter in the frequency domain to have the required non-
linear phase variation for encryption.
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An example of an FIR filter that meets this criterion is a
Hamming window based truncated Sinc filter whose impulse
response is defined by the kernel:
h(n) = sin 2π fc(n −
M
2 )
n − M2
(
0.54 − 0.46
(cos(2πn)
M
))
(15)
where fc is half of the intended bandwidth of the modulated
signal, M is the sample length of the truncated Sinc kernel,
n is the sample number ranging from 0 to M whose value is
selected depending upon the desired transition region between
the pass and stop bands. The FFT or frequency response of
this filter is as shown in Fig. 4. This filter exhibits a linear
phase response or constant group delay. This filter can be made
dispersive to encrypt the spectral characteristics of the signal
to be transmitted by introducing a non-linear characteristic in
the phase of its frequency response or FFT.
The design procedure for the encryption filter is similar to
that described in conference paper [21] as explained in the
following steps:
1) Obtain the symbol rate, occupied bandwidth (BW)
and modulation constellation of the modulated carrier
intended to be transmitted.
2) Calculate the minimum variation in GD over the band-
width of interest needed to cause constellation distortion
using the mathematical relation:
G D
Ts
≥ 1.15 (16)
3) Calculate the peak variation dθmax required in the phase
response by equating dω in equation (14) to BW noted
in step 1 and using the value of GD obtained in step 2.
4) Design a FIR filter kernel for the intended i.e. occupied
bandwidth of the modulated signal using the kernel
defined in equation (15). Obtain the FFT of the filter
designed, extract the amplitude and phase values of the
resulting spectrum.
5) Calculate the number of points occupied by the band-
width of interest in the FFT plot. For example, if the
bandwidth of the signal of interest is 160 MHz, gener-
ated digitally at a sample rate of 640 MHz and if the
number of points chosen for the FFT is 1024, the number
of FFT points occupied by the signal of interest would
be 256. Since FFT is a two-sided spectrum, half of the
frequency components would occupy the position from
1 to 128 and the other half would occupy the points
897 to 1024 in the example considered.
6) A subset of prime numbers chosen from the first and sec-
ond key sets are used as coefficient values of parameter
x to provide encryption phases y in a non-linear mathe-
matical function such as an elliptic function in the form.
y = p2 = (x3 + f1x + f2)mod f3 (17)
where f1, f2 and f3 are three prime numbers selected
by a symmetric algorithm from the two key sets,x is the
frequency bin number, p2 is the outcome of the non-
linear mathematical operation for a given value of x that
yields the encrypting phase value designated as y. One
of the challenges in designing the group delay variation
curve for single carrier schemes is that the variation
needs to be continuous to maintain the integrity of the
signal’s envelope. This is accomplished by subjecting
the values of y in (17) to raised cosine filtering.
7) The encryption phase values are added to the phases
of the FFT of a pre-determined FIR filter and its IFFT
is derived to yield the encrypting filter. The phases of
the encrypting filter in FFT domain are inverted and
subject to IFFT operation to yield the decrypting filter.
This completes the design of encryption and decrypting
filters to conceal and recover the modulated constellation
respectively. These filters are expected to be identical at
the two legitimate nodes.
The encryption of the modulated constellation is accom-
plished by convolving the modulated baseband with the
encryption filter at the transmitter in the digital domain prior to
conversion to analogue domain and transmission. The recovery
of the encrypted modulation symbols is accomplished by
convolving the encrypted baseband signal with the decryption
filter in digital domain at the receiver.
The generated keys are first tested for symmetry with
random data where Node 1 generates a set of random bits
and modulates them on to the intended constellation 8PSK
for example. The 8PSK modulated symbols are subject to the
necessary re-sampling, pulse shaping (Root Raised Cosine fil-
tering for example) depending on the modulation standard and
then convolved with the encrypting filter. The encrypted base-
band is transmitted after the other necessary signal processing
operations. Node 2 receives the signal transmitted by Node 1,
digitizes it, applies noise filtering and subjects the baseband
to decryption filtering to recover the modulation constellation.
The recovered baseband is then subject to equalization to
compensate for channel impairments. If the recovered modu-
lation phases at this stage do not correspond to standard values
within an agreed deviation limit, a failure message is sent to
Node 1 and the entire key generation process restarts. Else,
the recovered baseband modulation symbols are demodulated
to recover the transmitted symbols. Node 2 remodulates the
recovered symbols on to another baseband with the same
modulation scheme, encrypts the phases with its key and re-
transmits it. Node 1 now receives, decrypts and demodulates
the data to recover the bit-stream and compares it with that
it transmitted. If a match is found, a success message is
transmitted to Node 2. This completes the key generation
and agreement process for encrypting the phases of modulated
basebands along with the design of symmetric encryption and
decryption filters. It may be noted that no confidential data is
transmitted until this stage.
The encrypting phases and symbols are updated to new
values at both nodes by running a common algorithm that
selects different non-linear functions and different sub-set of
key values symmetrically at both nodes after a definite interval
of time has elapsed. This is done through timed interrupts.
On successful verification of the symmetry of constellation
encryption, Diffie Hellman key agreement process is initiated.
The preliminary keys A and B which are over 400 bits in
length are exchanged by modulating them on the chosen con-
stellation, subjecting the constellation to phase encryption and
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Fig. 9. Proposed PHY encryption and decryption in the transmitter and the
receiver of OFDM systems.
transmission over the channel. The transmission over phase
encrypted modulated signals authenticates the genuineness
of the initiating node thereby providing immunity against
impersonation attacks. The data to be communicated can now
be secured at both bit level an at the constellation.
C. Encrypting OFDM Systems
A subset of prime numbers chosen by a symmetric algo-
rithm from the two key sets are applied as coefficient values
in a non-linear function to generate encrypting phases. The
positions of the prime numbers in the non-linear function are
interchanged and the non-linear function is executed again to
obtain a convenient number of encrypting phase sequences.
The sequence with maximum variance is chosen to encrypt the
OFDM symbols to minimise PAPR. Unlike the single carrier
schemes, each modulated symbol is transmitted on a sub-
carrier in OFDM modulated signals. Therefore the encrypting
phases thus generated are added directly as offsets to the
phase of each sub-carrier. This method is computationally
more efficient than convolving the signal in time domain with a
dispersive filter. Three phase sequences were generated in the
experimental validation of this technique and their element-
wise product was taken to maximise variance. Randomisation
of phases of the sub-carriers in an OFDM modulated sig-
nal reduces its PAPR [15] along with providing security of
information [18]. This is an enhancement over prior art where
modulation phase of each sub-carrier including the pilot is
encrypted.
The generated keys are first tested for symmetry followed
by Diffie Hellman key agreement for bit-level encryption as in
the single carrier case after which the data to be communicated
can be encrypted and transmitted in secure manner. The
proposed physical layer encryption and decryption process
at the transmitter and receiver of each node to secure the
communication in OFDM systems is summarized in Fig. 9.
The procedure for key generation illustrated above is
applicable to TDD systems. The reciprocity of channel
response is not applicable to Frequency Division Duplex
(FDD) systems and it is therefore imperative to consider other
parameters for symmetric key generation. This is intended to
be taken up as future work.
III. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
The experimental validation was conducted for an 8PSK
signal case of bandwidth 100 MHz and for a QPSK-OFDM
Fig. 10. Gerber screenshot of the antenna designed and its simulated gain
pattern (dBi) in azimuth plane.
signal of the same bandwidth. The transmitter and the receiver
were built as per the block diagram shown in Fig. 3 for
transmission at carrier frequency 28.9 GHz. The IF in the
transmitter was selected at 600 MHz which was then up-
converted to 28.9 GHz. LO3 and LO4 were set at 14.15 GHz
and were multiplied in frequency by a factor of 2 owing
to better phase noise performance than using an oscillator
directly at 28.3 GHz to mix with the IF at 600 MHz to
yield the modulated carriers at 28.9 GHz at power +2 dBm.
The receiver consisted of an RF front end with a noise
figure around 3 dB and gain of 13 dB which down-converted
the received signal to an IF at 600 MHz. This was followed by
an analog to digital converter (ADC) clocked at 4 Gsps that
digitized the IF. Further down-conversion and demodulation
were accomplished in the digital domain. The antennas were
designed to have beam-widths of 120 degrees in the azimuth
plane as shown in Fig. 10 and etched on RO3003 substrate
from Rogers Corporation. An IF amplifier with a gain of 10dB
was used in the receiver section of Node 1 and no IF amplifier
was used in the receiver section of Node 2 to introduce
hardware differences at the two nodes which would introduce
differences in the noise figures at the two nodes.
A. Modulation Encryption Key Generation
A wooden test apparatus was designed with propagation
path length of a meter between its ends. This distance cor-
responds to 96 wavelengths at 28.9 GHz. One of the ends
of the apparatus was mounted with a patch antenna and
termed Node 1. Two additional antennas were fabricated on a
similar substrate for Node 2 and Node 3 at a spacing of eight
wavelengths with a ground plane in between them. Node 2 was
termed the second legitimate node and Node 3 was designated
to be the eavesdropper. An overall path loss of 51 dB was
observed between the legitimate nodes. The evaluation was
performed in a regular laboratory environment instead of an
anechoic chamber to emulate a real use case scenario that
would include multipath propagation effects. A picture of the
test bench is shown in Fig. 11.
The first task was to calibrate the receiver sections of the two
legitimate nodes for flatness of frequency response. This was
done using a calibrated signal generator SMW200A of Rohde
and Schwarz by sweeping the frequency of an input single tone
sine wave from 28.8 GHz to 29 GHz in steps of 5 MHz and
recording the variation whose values were used to build an FIR
filter to calibrate the frequency response. The next task was to
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Fig. 11. Test bench used for validation. Node 1 is on the left. Node 2 and
Node 3 are on the right. Node 3 is connected to a vector signal analyzer.
Fig. 12. Frequency responses of Node 1 and Node 2 at 28.9 GHz.
determine the hardware frequency responses of the two nodes
over the band of interest. The RF output of each node was
connected to a calibrated spectrum analyzer (FSQ40 Vector
Signal Analyzer from Rohde and Schwarz). A screenshot of
the un-calibrated hardware frequency responses of Node 1 and
Node 2 captured on the spectrum analyser is shown in Fig. 12.
The third task was to measure the extent of reciprocity of
the channel response between Node 1 and Node 2 (legiti-
mate) and the channel response between Node 1 and Node 3
(eavesdropper). The frequency responses of the transmitting
sections of the nodes were measured and recorded in the
form of an FIR filter whose procedure is detailed in [19].
The inverse transfer function of this FIR filter was derived for
each node in the form of another FIR filter to calibrate the
transmitting hardware over the bandwidth of interest. Node 1
was configured to receive and Node 2 and Node3 were made to
transmit a chirp pulse of duration 3.125x10−6 secs at alternate
time intervals after the transmitter in each node was calibrated.
The sample rate chosen was 640 MSPS. The down-converted
IF output of Node 1 was connected to a spectrum analyser and
the responses were observed with the traces saved. Node 1
was now configured to transmit and Node 2 was configured
to receive and its down-converted IF output was connected to
the spectrum analyzer. A screenshot of the recorded channel
responses is shown in Fig. 13. The channel responses between
Node 1 and Node 2 are nearly reciprocal and the channel
response between the eavesdropping node Node 3 and Node 1
rolls of at the upper band edge by 2 dB.
Having established the difference in the legitimate and
the eavesdropping channels, the next task was to generate
Fig. 13. Screenshot of measured channel responses between legitimate nodes
and the eavesdropper.
Fig. 14. Apparatus used for symmetric key generation.
symmetric keys between Node 1 and Node 2. The block dia-
gram of the apparatus used is shown in Fig. 14. A PC running
MATLAB was used as the DSP and timed interrupt generator.
A pair of DACs followed by a Ka Band transmitter was
connected to each of the legitimate nodes Node 1 and Node 2.
The receiver’s and transmitter’s RF paths were duplexed with
SPDT switches. The probe signal chosen was a chirp pulse
of duration 3.125x10−6 secs with a bandwidth of 100 MHz
generated at sample rate 640 MHz.
The channel was probed thrice by each node as explained in
section II at the appropriate time slots. The convolved channel
and transmitter hardware responses were computed at Node 1
and Node 2 as explained in Section II which yielded similar
data at both the legitimate nodes whose FFT could be used to
derive encryption keys.
A bandwidth of 112.5 MHz (100 MHz + additional band-
width of 12.5 MHz) in a 512 point FFT space sampled at
400 MHz would occupy 144 points symmetrically on both
sides. The first and last 72 points which contain the convolved
responses were extracted, subjected to moving median filtering
of span 3 to be used as the basis for encryption at each node.
These basis curves were subject to curve fitting operation for
key generation. Plots of the normalised basis curves extracted
from the convolved circuit and channel responses individually
at each authentic node is shown in Fig. 15. The plot of the
characteristics measured at Node 2 indicates higher amount of
noise. This was due to reduction in the gain at Node 2 which
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Fig. 15. Key generation information consisting of convolved channel and
hardware responses evaluated at each node.
was introduced deliberately to assess the ability to produce
symmetric encryption keys i the presence of noise. The effect
of noise was mitigated by moving median filtering.
The plotted curve was divided into regions on the basis
of change of slope after filtering. Each region was subject to
piece-wise curve-fitting operation to a non-linear function of
the form y = ax + bx3 + cx5 + d by applying the method of
least squares on MATLAB. The values at the 14 frequency bins
located at the centre of the curves pertaining to band edges in
the received responses were ignored. The ratio (d/a)+b was
computed in each case. In cases where the values obtained for
any of the coefficients were less than 0.1, they were replaced
by 0. The ratios k11 and k22 obtained at Node 1 and Node 2
when the curves were divided into five regions are as copied
below.
set1 = {5.06257, −1.49450, 0.9875, 30.0487, −11.475}
set2 = {5.20483, −1.49222, 0.9723, 30.0430, −10.633}
Each of the coefficient values were multiplied by a power
of 10 such that there were atleast two digits before a decimal
point and the magnitude was rounded off to the nearest prime
number which yielded symmetric sets of the first key at the
two nodes.
Node1K ey1 = {51, 13, 97, 31, 11}.
Node2K ey1 = {51, 13, 97, 31, 11}
The key sets Node1Key1 and Node2Key1 generated were
identical at the two legitimate nodes.
This was followed by a second key generation task which
involved division of the filtered responses into eight regions of
equal lengths of 18 data points and evaluating the RMS (root
mean squared) of the magnitudes of the normalised responses
in each region. The largest prime number of the index in
each region was extracted. The extracted prime numbers were
arranged in descending order of the rms value of the region
from which they were extracted. The rms values of each region
evaluated at Node 1 and Node 2 are as copied below.
rms Node1 = {0.6209, 0.6447, 0.6543, 0.6830,
0.8985, 0.7882, 0.6563, 0.5930}
rms Node2 = {0.5719, 0.6072, 0.6217, 0.6504,
0.8871, 0.7815, 0.6351, 0.5551}
Referring to Fig. 15, one can observe by inspection that
the region between data points 73 and 90 would have the
maximum rms value. The highest prime number in this region
is 89 and hence it would be the first entry in the second key
set.
Node1K ey2 = {89, 107, 71, 113, 53, 31, 17, 139}
Node2K ey1 = {89, 107, 71, 113, 53, 31, 17, 139}
The key sets generated were identical at the two legitimate
nodes. The entries in the second key set are just the highest
prime numbers in each region but the sequence in which they
are entered is critical to generation of the encryption phases.
Higher number of entries can be obtained for both the key
sets from response curves with higher number of data points.
Subsets of 3 prime numbers from the two key sets at the two
nodes were selected by a symmetric algorithm to generate the
phase offsets needed to encrypt the spectral characteristics of
the modulated signal to be transmitted.
In order to assess the extent to which the encryption data
could be generated by the eavesdropper, the RF front end
section of Node 2 was connected to Node 3 but a different
DAC was used in the base-band section. The convolved
channel and hardware frequency responses evaluated at Node 3
with the Chirp stimulus eavesdropped from Node 1 is also
shown in Fig. 15. This curve is significantly different from
that computed at the legitimate nodes and hence would result
in different key sets.
Values of base g and modulus p for the Diffie-Hellman
scheme were chosen to be 51 and 2512 − 51 respectively.
The exponent ’a’ chosen at Node 1 was 61 and ’b’ chosen
at Node 2 was 71. These yielded values of A and B as below.
An online tool [23] was used for computation along with low
level file read and write operations since a 512 bit number was
beyond the ability of the version of MATLAB available.
A = 1451378689164943263922633327668564641294
64670643080753119747167566412174888653062
050070925329124534578051
B = 172775637049938565322123634515964475966
2377170068440963043617394926678442633326257
5344791804129467839402142422442056841051
These values were converted to bits and transmitted by
Node 1 and Node 2 on modulation encrypted carriers in each
of the validation case explained below. The raw bit stream
was transmitted in each case without forward error correction
(FEC) since the distance was small. FEC may be added as
needed in field.
B. Encryption of Single Carrier Modulated Signals
The first case of validation was for a single carrier mod-
ulation scheme similar to that chosen in [24]. An 8PSK
modulated signal of bandwidth 96 MHz was chosen for this
case. The symbol rate was set at 80 Msps. The modulated
digital baseband was subject to raised cosine filtering with roll
off factor α = 0.2 at an oversampling ratio of 4. The resulting
sample rate was 320 Msps and the occupied bandwidth was
Authorized licensed use limited to: Maynooth University Library. Downloaded on October 27,2020 at 14:22:49 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
536 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS–I: REGULAR PAPERS, VOL. 67, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2020
80 × 106(1 + α) = 96 MHz. The minimum in-band nonlinear
peak phase variation needed to encrypt this signal calculated
as explained in section II was 7.23 radians.
A random bitstream of 18000 bits was chosen to test the
symmetry of the constellation encryption keys.The phases for
the encrypting filter at Node 1 were derived by applying
three of the thirteen entries in the key sets Node1Key2 and
Node1Key2 as coefficient values in the elliptic function
described by 17. The values of f1, f2 and f3 selected for
this operation were 47, 89 and 17 respectively to encrypt
the first 6000 bits. The values of f2 and f3 were swapped
to generate the encrypting symbols for the next 6000 8PSK
modulated data symbols and so on to test for symmetry of the
constellation encryption keys generated at both nodes.
The first 39 values of the designed phase response were
extracted, subject to root-raised cosine filtering with an up-
sampling factor of 4 and added to the phases of the FFT of
an FIR filter of length 320 described in (15). The IFFT of the
modified filter was computed to obtain the encrypting filter at
Node 1. The phases of the encrypting filter in the frequency
domain were inverted and the IFFT was computed to obtain
the decrypting filter at Node 2.
The 8PSK modulated data symbols of the random bit-
stream were subject to RRC filtering as per DVB-S2 standard,
convolved with the encrypting filter at Node 1 to conceal
its constellation. The encryption and decryption filters were
switched after transmission of 6000 symbols to avoid detection
of the encrypting phases by an adaptive equalizer in the
eavesdroppers. The encrypted signal was transmitted over
the air interface at 28.9 GHz, received by Node 2, subject
to equalization and decryption filtering, down-sampling and
recovery of symbols. The recovered symbols were decrypted
and the transmitted bit-stream was demodulated without errors.
A plot of the received constellation of an 8PSK signal prior
to equalization and decryption is shown in Fig. 16. The
8PSK constellation after decryption and channel equalization
is shown in Fig. 17. This task verified the symmetry of the
constellation encryption keys.
A VSA (Vector Signal Analyzer) with an internal equal-
izer based on LMS (Least Mean Squares) was used as the
eavesdropping receiver. The length of the equalizer was set
at 10 and step size was set at 0.05. The sampling frequency
of the VSA was also set at 320 MHz. The transmission
was repeated continuously for five minutes and a faithful
recovery of the constellation could not be observed. The length
of the equalizer in the VSA was varied from 5 to 20 in
steps of 5 and step size was also switched between 0.01 and
0.05 in each case after running for 5 minutes. No faithful
recovery of the constellation could be observed in any attempt.
The observations demonstrate that it is essential to use the
appropriate decryption filter to first recover the modulation
symbols before attempting to demodulate the signal. As the
next step, the bitstream for Diffie-Hellman preliminary keys
A and B were generated at Node 1 and Node 2 respectively.
Since A and B could be of different lengths, zeros were
appended in the beginning of the respective bitstreams to
make the length l equal to that of the modulus. The resulting
bitstream was encrypted with the first l bits from the random
Fig. 16. First 1000 symbols of he received encrypted 8PSK signal before
decryption and equalization.
Fig. 17. Recovered 8PSK constellation after decryption filtering and
equalization.
bitstream transmitted earlier, modulated on 8PSK symbols
and transmitted after encrypting the constellation. The process
was reversed at the respective receivers and the transmitted
values of A and B were recovered. These were subject to the
computation of final keys:
A1 = (Ba)modp;
B1 = (Ab)modp;
A1 = 1118041499078512949486124996043783154132067
94053927797327982558582809685194406546300
34570483850634219393359798225119547434115
508830098225868311167306077536 = B1.
The values of A1 and B1 were used to encrypt and decrypt
data bits in further transmissions without errors.
C. Encryption of an OFDM Signal
The proposed security scheme was tested on an OFDM
system as the second case. A 2048 point FFT based OFDM
signal with 1664 active sub-carriers including 128 pilots was
generated at sample rate 100 MHz. The modulation chosen
for the sub-carriers was QPSK. The data to be transmitted was
mapped on to QPSK constellation points on the 1536 active
sub-carriers. The amplitudes of all the active sub-carriers were
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constant since the chosen modulation scheme was QPSK.
A constant phase of 45 degrees was chosen for the pilots.
The objective here was to encrypt the signal to jointly achieve
PAPR reduction and security in the physical layer. The ran-
domization of the phases of the sub-carrier is one of the ways
to reduce PAPR [15], [18] for which the selection of the
encryption phases at the transmitter and and its knowledge
at the receiver are critical. A random stream of 3072 bits
was generated at Node 1 and modulated on the 1536 data
subcarriers with QPSK modulation.
z1 = (( f1x3 + f2x)mod f3)mod2π (18)
z2 = (( f2x3 + f3x)mod f1)mod2π (19)
z3 = (( f3x3 + f1x)mod f2)mod2π (20)
z4 = (z1z2z3)mod2π (21)
The next task was to generate chaotic phase values to
encrypt the spectrum of the OFDM signal. This was done
by applying a subset of three prime numbers in the key
sets Node1Key1 and Node1Key2.The values of f1, f2 and f3
selected for this operation were 47, 89 and 17 respectively.
Three sets of encryption phases each of length 1664 were
generated applying the selected prime numbers in elliptic
functions as per equations (18, 19 and 20) and a fourth set
was generated by taking the element-wise products of the
first three sets to modulo 2π as described by (21). The ratio
of variance to mean was computed for each set and the
phases in the set that had the highest ratio was chosen for
encryption. This was computed at both nodes for symmetric
encryption and decryption. The set z4 was the best candidate
hence the phase values in its set were added to the phases
of the 1664 active sub-carriers (excluding null sub-carriers)
at Node 1 for encryption. A plot of the constellation of the
encrypted sub-carriers is shown in Fig. 18. The IFFT of the
encrypted subcarriers was computed to yield the time domain
signal. A cyclic prefix of 144 samples was appended and
the signal was up-sampled by a factor of 2 and transmitted
over the 28.9GHz air interface after the necessary signal
processing operations. It was observed that the average PAPR
of the encrypted signal was reduced by 3 dB. This aspect
is explored further in the next sub-section. The signal was
received at Node 2, down-sampled to the original sample
rate after the necessary signal processing operations and the
added cyclic pre-fix was removed. The FFT of the received
signal was computed and the sub-carriers and subject to
decryption of phases. This led to the successful recovery the
transmitted constellation. A plot of the constellation of the
decrypted sub-carriers is shown in Fig.19. The amplitudes of
the sub-carriers were equalized and symbols in the received
constellation were decrypted by means of modulo subtraction
of the encrypting symbols to recover the original symbols. The
recovered symbols were demodulated to recover the original
bit stream without errors. As the next task, the preliminary
Diffie-Hellman keys A and B were exchanged on the wireless
link after appending zeros in the beginning to make the length
equal to 3072 bits and encrypting the resulting bit-stream
with the random bit-stream exchanged earlier.The process was
reversed at the receivers to recover the values of A and B
Fig. 18. Phase encrypted OFDM sub-carriers received over the 28.9GHz
wireless link.
Fig. 19. Recovered QPSK constellation of OFDM sub-carriers received over
the 28.9 GHz wireless link.
which were then used to compute the values of the final keys
A1 and B1 as in the single carrier case. A1 and B1 were used as
the encryption and decryption keys for further transmissions.
The validation was repeated thrice successfully with different
bit streams and encryption keys.
D. PAPR Reduction
The effectiveness of PAPR reduction was tested by mea-
suring the probability of the signal exceeding a threshold
value. This may be expressed mathematically by means of
a cumulative distribution function [15] of the form (22) where
N is the number of sub-carriers and P AP RT is the threshold
PAPR value.
Prob(P AP R > P AP RT ) = 1 − (1 − e−P AP RT )N (22)
Simulations were carried out in MATLAB for 10000 cycles
of randomly generated bit streams, modulation and encryption
of the subcarriers with the same encrypting phases generated
using the encryption key as that used for the validation of
the security aspect in the previous subsection. From this it
was possible to identify a scheme that would simultaneously
reduce PAPR and provide physical layer security. The complex
cumulative distribution function (CCDF) plots for the resulting
reduced PAPR signal are shown in Fig.20. The proposed
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Fig. 20. CCDF of PAPR of original and encrypted 2048 point OFDM
modulated signals with 1664 active sub-carriers.
scheme reduced the PAPR by 3.5dB on average and by over
4.2dB when there is a 2 × 10−4 probability of the original
signal exceeding a threshold PAPR of 15.5dB. A limitation in
this scheme is that the receiver would need a higher signal
to noise ratio than time domain PAPR reduction schemes
when this scheme is applied to OFDM signals with higher
modulation constellations. This can be mitigated using error
correction schemes. The ability to recover the bit-stream
without the need for side-information and the reduction in
linearity requirements of the PA in the transmitter outweigh
the limitation.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper a novel scheme to provide security in the
physical layer along with reducing the peak to average power
ratio of OFDM signals through dispersion of the phases of
the modulated signal has been proposed and experimentally
validated. The scheme conceals the modulated constellation
from eavesdroppers using symmetric encryption keys which
are generated at the legitimate communication nodes exploit-
ing the channel and non-ideal circuit characteristics over the
bandwidth of interest. Bit level encryption keys are further
exchanged over carriers whose modulations are concealed
thereby providing immunity against impersonation attacks.
The experimental validation used an end-to-end wireless link
at 28.9 GHz which was constructed in-house. It has been
demonstrated that the physical layer encryption technique
can be successfully reversed at the legitimate receiver on
the experimental testbench to recover the original modulated
symbols with zero bit errors. The proposed physical layer
encryption technique successfully concealed both single car-
rier and OFDM modulated signals from a well positioned
eavesdropper and a reduction of PAPR by 3.5dB was also
achieved for an OFDM signal with 1664 QPSK modulated
sub-carriers.
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